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PREFACE 
ackling climate change poses one of the world’s greatest challenges. 
The growing need for energy from fossil fuels, amongst other 
activities, contributes to the increases in greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
associated with climate change. This will require fundamental changes in 
the way we produce and consume energy. In this CEPS Task Force, which 
has been my pleasure to chair, we discussed and finally identified a list of 
concrete measures that have the potential both to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and stimulate long-term structural change and 
technology development and diffusion. Structural change calls for an 
action-based approach and supporting measures to achieve the necessary 
reductions. I believe that such action-based approaches can help integrate 
targets and timetables, as they are agreed, with consistent and comparable 
policies and measures. Such integration will facilitate a robust global 
climate change agreement, which we all hope will be struck in Copenhagen 
in late 2009. 
The CEPS Task Force has brought together representatives from 
different stakeholders that included senior executives from a broad range 
of industries – including energy production and supply companies, energy-
intensive industries and service companies – and representatives from 
business associations and non-governmental environmental organisations. 
The members of the Task Force engaged in extensive debates in the course 
of several meetings. During the meetings, they also had ample opportunity 
to discuss these issues with officials from the EU institutions, member 
states and international organisations. 
I want to thank the members of the Task Force for their active and 
positive contributions throughout the meetings. Although each member 
endorses the general content of the report, one should not conclude that all 
members subscribe to every sentence of the text. I would also like to thank 
N o r i k o  F u j i w a r a  f r o m  C E P S  w h o ,  i n  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i t h  C h r i s t i a n  
Egenhofer, has been leading the effort to draft this report.  
 
Gunnar Still 
Chairman of the CEPS Task Force  
Senior Vice President, Head of Environment Division ThyssenKrupp 
T  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
limate change has become a major topic of the G8 meetings since the 
launch of the Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean 
Energy and Sustainable Development in 2005. This initiative has 
sought to explore new approaches to international cooperation on clean 
energy technologies between developed and emerging economies. At the 
2007 UN conference on climate change in Bali, a formal process was 
launched to address countries’ commitments in the so-called ‘post-2012 
period’ after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, aiming to 
meet the objective of UNFCCC itself to avoid ‘dangerous climate change’. 
In the EU, the EU heads of state and government have agreed on the need 
for a comprehensive package of responses to energy needs and climate 
change, welcoming the Commission’s proposal. Moreover, a new strategy 
for EU industrial policy intends to create incentives to unlock the full 
potential of low carbon and resource-efficient goods, technologies and 
services in the EU in order to make Europe a ‘forerunner’ in these markets. 
Against this background, this report identifies a number of concrete 
measures that could reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while at the 
same time stimulating structural change and technology development and 
diffusion. The report calls for supporting action-based approaches, which 
are essential to achieve the necessary reductions in GHG emissions, inform 
the post-2012 negotiations and address the most urgent issues such as 
surging energy demand and the need for clean energy technologies in 
emerging economies. An action-based approach can be regarded as a way 
of integrating targets and timetables, as they are agreed, with consistent 
and comparable policies and measures. With a view to a long-term climate 
strategy, this report attempts to present a portfolio of actions that can be 
implemented and accelerated on a global scale – especially in the G8+5 
countries and the EU, and could become a basis on which these developed 
and developing countries can cooperate.  
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I.  Key messages 
Merits of action-based approaches 
1)  There seems to be an emerging consensus on a push for policies to 
accelerate structural change and transition towards a low carbon 
economy, no matter how the post-2012 discussions develop. This 
trend can be facilitated by putting stronger emphasis on action-based 
approaches, closer cooperation between governments and 
stakeholders, and research into the scope for sector-specific 
mitigation options as witnessed in the implementation of the 
Gleneagles Plan of Action. Action-based approaches play an 
important role in achieving the emission reduction targets of the 
Kyoto Protocol and in putting into place the infrastructure, 
technologies and experience that will help to stimulate the further 
decarbonisation of development in the post-2012 period. Action-
based approaches could also influence discussions on the post-2012 
agreement in terms of direction, speed and depth by encouraging the 
sharing of data and knowledge, by facilitating the comparability of 
actions and by improving transparency. At the same time, such 
approaches could gain more support if guided by the level of 
ambition (e.g. a call for developed countries to reduce GHG 
emissions by 60–80% by 2050 from 1990 levels (European Council, 
2007)).  
2)  Countries are more likely to undertake actions and reduce emissions 
if their efforts are acknowledged. A common yardstick would enable 
assessment of the progress made through domestic measures, e.g. in 
terms of reductions against business-as-usual levels or in costs. Such 
an instrument could also increase trust in the international 
negotiations. Ultimately, a yardstick could develop into a benchmark 
against which the performance of countries could be measured and 
thus become part of a compliance mechanism in a future climate-
change regime.  
Carbon pricing and its limits  
3)  Action-based approaches that put a constraint on emissions will also 
ensure that the value of carbon is increasingly reflected in prices. This 
move will in turn enhance the efficiency of the market by providing MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 3 
 
incentives for consumers and businesses to save energy, improve 
efficiency and use less carbon-intensive energy sources. At the same 
time, it will encourage businesses to invest in low-carbon 
technologies or may trigger the establishment of new services such as 
energy service companies. The more visible and universal price 
signals are, the more robust these incentives should be. A 
precondition is that the carbon intensity of products and services is 
correctly reflected in the decisions of market participants. Still, 
although carbon pricing is necessary, it is not enough on its own. 
Market failures that justify intervention are typically associated with 
i) technology development, demonstration and deployment; ii) 
energy efficiency in the domestic sector; and iii) changes in consumer 
behaviour. Governments can learn from best practices. It must be also 
k e p t  i n  m i n d  t h a t  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  o b j e c t i v e s  n e e d  t o  b e  b a l a n c e d  
against other environmental, economic and public policy objectives in 
order to foster sustainable development.  
The untapped potential in emerging economies  
4)  Experience suggests that primary energy use in developing countries 
can be cut by 30-50% because the cost of energy savings is negligible 
compared with the cost of increasing energy supply. While energy 
intensity started declining mostly as a result of structural changes in 
emerging economies (and to an extent in economies in transition), 
much of the technical potential across the supply, transmission and 
use of energy is still to be tapped. Even so, major challenges remain. 
Without changes in policy frameworks and appropriate instruments 
to facilitate investment in new technologies, emerging economies are 
likely to follow a carbon-intensive development path. In most 
emerging economies, there are strong pressures for the quick 
expansion of energy supply, notably for power generation and 
transport fuels, with little short-term emphasis on substituting fossil 
fuels. Technological cooperation combined with capacity-building 
can help in the important area of fuel-switching. Most probably, such 
efforts will necessitate substantial financial transfers from developed 
to developing and emerging economies among other steps towards 
enhancing adaptive capacity, because given their limited domestic 
sources, the latter will likely continue in most cases to prioritise 
growth over mitigation. Furthermore, the increase of financial 
transfers can be seen as a first sign of developed countries’ 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
determination to fulfil their commitments under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to take a lead in the fight 
against climate change. 
Specific action-based approaches  
This report further analyses some examples of action-based approaches for 
energy supply, sectoral initiatives for global industry, an integrated road 
transport policy, buildings and appliances.  
Energy supply: Avoiding being locked into high-carbon technologies  
5)  The EU set a target of a 20–30% GHG emissions cut from the 1990 
levels by 2020, motivated by the ambition that future climate change 
will be limited to an increase of no more than 2°C above pre-
industrial levels. Improving the efficiency of existing equipment is 
important for reducing emissions but will not be enough to meet the 
target. The main challenge is how to encourage the replacement of 
existing assets by low-carbon technologies and investment in near-
zero carbon technologies such as renewables, nuclear power, and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) in order to avoid being locked into 
high-carbon capital technologies. In the absence of a robust, global, 
long-term price signal for GHG emissions, for example through a 
global climate-change agreement, the single most important 
instrument for the EU is the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). 
Both the level of the cap – i.e. the scarcity and by extension the price 
of allowances – and allocations will be crucial for the future structure 
of the capital stock of the ETS sector. The allocation rules (for 
distributing allowances) for the trading periods beginning in 2013 
and beyond will be fundamental for stimulating investment in low-
carbon technologies.  
6)  In addition, systems supporting the deployment of existing but not 
yet competitively advantageous technologies such as renewables 
could be effective. The International Energy Agency, for instance, 
estimates that each doubling of such capacity can lower costs by 18–
20%, although this kind of ‘learning’ differs across technologies, 
mainly depending on how mature they are. This is the reason why 
support systems for renewables and the EU flagship programme for 
CCS are needed. Nevertheless, incentives should be technology-
neutral to the extent possible to encourage innovation and MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 5 
 
entrepreneurship, thus devising the most cost-effective solutions. 
Other advantageous technologies such as combined heat and power 
(CHP) and district heating and cooling may not reach their full 
potential because of market and non-market barriers or the lack of an 
appropriate framework, improved data or analytical tools.  
Approaches for industrial sectors 
7)  As sectoral approaches and their designs evolve, questions about 
how they can fit into existing policies and practices become more 
urgent. New initiatives such as sectoral approaches will most likely 
be expected to complement existing frameworks rather than replace 
them.  
8)  There are four ways in which sectoral approaches could 
constructively interact with EU policy priorities in a significant way 
and thereby increase support from both governments and 
stakeholders. These relate to collecting data and formulating sectoral 
performance benchmarks. 
•  Sectoral performance benchmarks can be used for setting a cap 
if they are based on best practice or the best available 
technology in a sector. 
•  Sectoral benchmarks can be also used for allocation, at least as 
long as free allocation continues. 
•  The linking of emissions trading schemes would be facilitated 
and accelerated by coordination of the central design options 
such as cap-setting, (free) allocation, and monitoring, reporting 
and verification. Sectoral approaches can assist the coordination 
efforts. 
•  Sectoral performance benchmarks could be a useful tool for 
measuring, reporting and verifying actions and extended to a 
possible sectoral clean-development mechanism.  
Integrated approaches to mobility –the example of cars and vans 
9)  Unlike industry sectors such as cement and steel, transport and 
mobility involve a whole range of actors along the chain, ranging 
from fuel suppliers to product development and to consumers and 
users. Thus, responsibility for emissions is diffused across a number 
of integrated, yet separate components and actors: fuels, engine and 6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
vehicle technologies, infrastructure, consumer preferences and 
driving behaviour. Although this situation will necessitate an 
integrated approach based on flexibility and alternative options, the 
capacity of governments to implement integrated approaches is still 
limited and has to be developed. Experiences from integrated 
approaches such as the Auto-Oil and the European Climate Change 
Programme indicate the need for a high level of transparency and the 
inclusion of major stakeholders (especially legislators) as well as 
considerable resources for independent, high-quality scientific 
support. A particular challenge for policy-makers will be to find a 
consensus on the contributions of the various components of the 
transport sector to emission reductions, for example, through 
assigning specific targets. Uneven contributions by the different 
components would not only risk jeopardising the least-cost 
abatement goal but eventually political acceptability and, by 
extension, implementation. Flexibility for stakeholders in reaching 
their specific targets would reduce this risk by balancing initially 
uneven allocations to some extent. In the end, the success of 
integrated approaches will depend on the successful development of 
suitable performance indicators for those stakeholders responsible for 
the different components: manufacturers, fuel producers, 
governments as infrastructure providers and consumers as buyers 
and drivers. Suitable indicators are a precondition for i) developing 
targets, ii) monitoring progress and iii) enforcing compliance. The 
definitive test for the success of an integrated approach is whether the 
aggregate emission reductions envisaged are achieved.  
An integrated approach will be aided by an efficient system 
based on a set of fiscal instruments, for example, the use of fuel, 
vehicle or circulation taxes as incentives for consumers to buy low-
carbon or more efficient vehicles or to switch to more climate-friendly 
driving behaviour. 
End-use energy efficiency 
Energy efficiency holds the biggest potential across all sectors to reduce 
GHG emissions in the short and medium term. This report singles out 
buildings and appliances, for which there is significant scope for emission 
reductions. Implementing a wide range of available techniques for 
insulation, heating and lighting or for the replacement of appliances could MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 7 
 
reduce energy consumption by 20–50%, often in a cost-effective way with a 
payback period of 10 years or less.  
Buildings 
10)  Considerable ‘no-regret options’ exist in thermal insulation, high 
performance windows and solar shading, airtight structural details, 
ventilation and heat/cold recovery systems, supported by the 
integration of renewable energy production in buildings. Even so, in 
order to reach the full potential that buildings offer, the current EU 
focus on new buildings will need to be enlarged to include existing 
buildings (i.e. renovations) and buildings smaller than the current 
legislated threshold of 1,000 square metres. Concentration on new, 
innovative low-energy and low-GHG techniques for new buildings is 
crucial to avoid lock-in with respect to the new housing stock but 
fails to address the majority of emissions in the buildings sector.  
11)  Experience in the EU and elsewhere suggests that the full potential is 
best reached by combining different policy measures, such as more 
stringent regulation, the (re-)introduction of financial stimuli, better 
information campaigns and training in the construction and 
maintenance industries. For the EU, where the principal 
competencies in energy matters lie with the member states, an 
immediate way forward would be to screen and compare member 
state policies to identify best practices. This step requires increased 
resources in terms of both money and staff in EU administrations in 
addition to continued political commitment. Comparisons among the 
member states are facilitated by indicators, which, for example, could 
be developed further by the European Commission in conjunction 
with stakeholders.  
Appliances  
12)  Another important area of emissions in terms of scope for reductions 
is appliances. More than 500 million appliances with old technology 
are in use in developed country markets. Household appliances will 
also be among the fastest-growing sources of CO2 emissions in 
developing countries. A major reason why the potential of appliances 
is not reached is the long life cycle of domestic appliances.  8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
13)  This Task Force has identified a number of actions that could assist in 
reaching the full potential of emission reductions that appliances 
offer. These include 
–  undistorted energy (and electricity) price-setting that reflects the 
real energy costs and specifically the costs of carbon; 
–  smart information and labelling campaigns to encourage 
consumers to examine the economic and environmental effects of 
their choices based on a life-cycle perspective that incorporates, 
for example, not only emissions from material use but also 
benefits from (eco-)design. Global information and labelling 
campaigns could overcome or even prevent potential trade 
barriers stemming from the development of diverse technical 
standards in different countries;  
–  government incentive schemes to increase the rate of replacement 
by encouraging consumers to replace energy-inefficient 
equipment with highly energy-efficient products, particularly 
cooling appliances;  
–  assessment of the potential that additional finance from 
international financial institutions could have in speeding up 
replacement in emerging economies, especially of cooling 
appliances; and  
–  enforcement of existing laws and regulations, e.g. the one-watt 
standby initiative. 
II.  Recommendations  
The Task Force has formulated the following recommendations: 
1)  The EU and other governments should support action-based 
approaches not just because they can reduce emissions here and now 
but also because they can enhance knowledge about the potential of 
various abatement options and their costs.  
2)  Governments must provide a clear signal that the value of carbon will 
be reflected in energy and other prices to ensure that the objective of 
reducing GHG emissions can be appropriately incorporated into 
investment decisions, as many low-carbon technologies are getting 
closer to becoming economical. MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 9 
 
3)  Until a robust, global carbon-price signal emerges from a post-2012 
agreement, governments should continue to support the deployment 
of promising low-carbon technologies such as renewables and CCS to 
bring down the costs of the technologies.  
Energy supply 
4)  Action-based approaches must focus on encouraging the replacement 
of existing assets in the energy supply sector to avoid lock-in with 
respect to a high-carbon capital stock.  
5)  The EU must use the review of the EU ETS to ensure that allocation 
rules provide incentives for investment in sustainable low-carbon 
technologies.  
6)  In parallel, governments should improve their data and analytical 
tools to develop strategies for other promising technologies such as 
CHP and district heating and cooling.  
Approaches for industrial sectors 
7)  Governments and industry together should test various concepts of 
sectoral approaches in practice (proof of concept) by undertaking 
pilot projects in key countries and sectors to assess whether four 
challenges – technical issues related to data definition and collection, 
the risks of anti-competitive behaviour, workable incentives for 
governments and industry in developing countries, and a suitable 
governance structure – can be pragmatically solved. 
8)  The governments of developed countries in cooperation with 
industry and international bodies should make progress in capacity-
building in the governments or industries of developing countries. 
9)  Industry should reinforce its efforts to develop performance 
benchmarks that are practical to use and are acceptable in sectors 
across a range of developed and developing economies. 
10)  Industry sectors should attempt to develop a common framework 
that sets out principles for monitoring, reporting and verification or 
principles and processes to develop benchmarks and provide 
information to governments and international organisations. 
11)  Industry sectors should particularly bring together the results of 
existing successful works on monitoring and verification or those on 
indicators and data collection. 10 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
12)  Industry and governments should harmonise the data formats of 
various databases. 
Integrated approaches to mobility – the example of cars and vans 
13)  To provide incentives for consumers and drivers, governments must 
reform the system based on fuel, vehicle or circulation taxes to 
encourage consumers to buy low-carbon or more efficient vehicles or 
to switch to more climate-friendly driving behaviour. 
14)  As there are market failures and other barriers that pricing/taxation 
alone will not overcome, the EU should attempt to devise an 
integrated policy for the various components of the transport sector – 
fuels, engine and vehicle technologies, infrastructure, consumer 
preferences and driving behaviour – to achieve emission reductions 
at the lowest cost.  
15)  EU funding in the transport sector should be targeted towards 
sustainable transport infrastructures, sustainable transport solutions 
and technology research and deployment.  
16)  The EU should develop suitable indicators, inter alia, to i) determine 
targets, which can be reached in a technologically- and economically-
reasonable way ii) monitor progress and iii) enforce compliance, in 
order to ensure that targets are measurable and enforceable. 
Flexibility in how to reach their targets should be given to the 
individual stakeholders in order to realise the most cost-efficient 
potential. 
End-use energy efficiency  
Buildings 
17)  The EU should put stronger emphasis on existing buildings and 
dwellings, where the principal potential lies.  
18)  To reach the full potential in buildings and dwellings, the EU and 
other governments should combine different policy measures in 
parallel, such as more stringent regulation, (re-)introduction of 
financial stimuli, and better information campaigns and training in 
the construction and maintenance industries.  
19)  The EU should continue to focus on screening and comparing 
member state policies to identify best practices, but will need to make 
available more resources for these activities.  MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 11 
 
20)  The European Commission, together with stakeholders associated 
with the buildings sector, could further develop appropriate 
indicators to aid comparability.  
Appliances  
21)  To reach the potential for emission reductions related to appliances, 
governments must  
a)  ensure an undistorted energy (and electricity) price that reflects 
the real costs of energy, including the costs of carbon;  
b)  initiate smart information and labelling campaigns to 
encourage consumers to examine the economic and 
environmental effects of their choices based on a life-cycle 
perspective that incorporates, for example, not only emissions 
from material use but also benefits from eco-design; and  
c)  implement and enforce existing decisions and laws such as the 
one-watt standby initiative.  
22)  Governments should also  
d)  launch government incentive schemes to increase the rate of 
replacement, especially of cooling appliances; and  
e)  assess the potential that additional finance from international 
financial institutions could have in speeding up replacement in 
emerging economies, particularly of cooling appliances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
limate change has been at the top of the G8 agenda since 2005. The 
UK’s G8 presidency launched a process to accelerate worldwide 
action on climate change, engaging five major emerging economies 
– Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa – in discussions towards a 
global agreement, which became known as the Gleneagles Dialogue on 
Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development. The 
backbone of the 2005 Gleneagles commitments is the Gleneagles Plan of 
Action (Box 1), which pledges to promote innovation, energy efficiency and 
conservation, to improve policy, regulatory and financing frameworks and 
to accelerate the deployment of cleaner (particularly lower-emitting) 
technologies. Among other things, the opportunity for cost-effective 
investment in cleaner energy technologies and greater efficiency is 
highlighted. Implementation of the commitments made in the Gleneagles 
Plan of Action has been monitored in the course of the Dialogue in close 
cooperation with the International Energy Agency (IEA), the World Bank 
and other initiatives.  
The G8 summit in Germany in June 2007 stressed ‘actions’ on all 
fronts. It led to a common understanding about the need for long-term 
action and the importance of the UN climate process as the ‘appropriate 
forum’ for negotiating future global efforts on climate change, while 
addressing possible contributions from emerging economies through a 
range of actions leading to carbon-intensity reductions. The Gleneagles 
Dialogue will wrap up the two-year discussion and prepare a report to the 
G8 summit due in Japan in July 2008. The Japanese G8 presidency has 
identified climate change as one of the main themes for the summit. It 
prioritises the following three principles for establishing an effective 
framework beyond 2012: the participation of all major emitters, including 
developing countries; flexibility and diversity; and compatibility between 
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environmental protection and economic growth by utilising energy 
conservation and other technologies.1  
 
 
 
The final stage of the Gleneagles Dialogue will likely benefit from the 
momentum gained in the 2007 UN conference on climate change in Bali 
with the announcement of the Bali Action Plan. The Bali Action Plan has 
launched a formal process to discuss a post-2012 agreement through the 
creation of a new Ad-hoc Working Group on a Long-term Cooperative 
Action Plan (AWG-LCA) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The first meeting of this group in Bangkok in April 
2008 saw agreement on a work programme and the schedule for 
workshops focused on specific themes. Discussions will likely centre on the 
                                                      
1 For further information on the G8 Tokyo summit, see the website of the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/ 
2008/index.html). 
Box 1. Six priorities of the Gleneagles Plan of Action 
1.  Energy use in buildings (building standards, renewable energy and 
efficiency partnerships to outreach to developing countries; 
procurement and management of public buildings), appliances 
(coordination of international policies on labelling, standard-setting 
and testing procedures), surface transport, aviation and industry 
(voluntary initiatives, the improvement of energy efficiency 
performance, cross-border partnerships and technology transfer) 
2.  Cleaner fossil fuels for power generation (research, dissemination and 
demonstration, clean coal, the reduction of gas flaring, renewables and 
electricity grids) 
3.  Efforts for strengthening international cooperation and R&D 
4.  The financing of the transition to clean energy with a focus on 
improving the investment climate and developing market 
5.  Adaptation 
6.  Work to tackle illegal logging with a focus on halting environmental 
degradation and moving towards sustainability. MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 15 
 
main building blocks for a post-2012 agreement, which include both 
widely-agreed themes such as mitigation, adaptation, finance and 
technology as well as emerging topics such as avoided deforestation and 
sectoral approaches. 
Moreover, a Major Economies Meeting, initially proposed by the US, 
took on a new dimension when France, which is to take over the EU 
presidency in the second half of 2008, hosted the subsequent meeting on 
17/18 April 2008 with an emphasis on sectoral approaches. It is expected 
that there will be increasing interaction and synergy among processes such 
as the Gleneagles Dialogue, the AWG-LCA and the Major Economies 
Meeting, while each process in turn draws wider participation from 
emerging and developing economies.  
Although its share of global CO2 emissions is relatively small, the EU 
has been one of the most vocal advocates for the fight against climate 
change and for leading global efforts towards a global climate change 
agreement. In 2007, the EU heads of state and government agreed on a 
“firm independent commitment” to at least a 20% reduction in greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions by 2020 from 1990 levels, which can be increased to 
30% on the conclusion of an international agreement (European Council, 
2007).2  T h i s  t a r g e t  w a s  p r o p o s e d  a s  p a r t  o f  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  e n e r g y  a n d  
climate change package.3 Other commitments include a binding target of 
sourcing 20% of the EU’s total energy consumption from renewable energy 
by 2020 and a binding minimum target of sourcing a 10% share of biofuels 
in overall EU transport petrol and diesel consumption by 2020. In the push 
for technology, the EU has also agreed on the development of a strategic 
energy technology plan and a carbon capture and storage (CCS) policy (see 
section 3.4). Discussions on the further spread of efforts on GHG emission 
reductions (European Commission 2008a) and renewables among member 
states (European Commission 2008b), changes to the design of the EU 
                                                      
2 The 30% cut is a commitment on the condition that other developed countries 
also commit themselves to GHG emission reductions as part of an international 
agreement. At the same time, the EU has advocated that developed countries 
reduce their emissions collectively by 60% to 80% by 2050 from 1990 levels.  
3 See the European Commission’s website and related articles under the heading 
“Energy for a Changing World” (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/ 
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emissions trading scheme (ETS) after 2012 (European Commission 2008c) 
or the development of CCS pilot projects (European Commission 2008d) 
have begun since the publication of the Commission’s integrated proposal 
for a climate action and renewable energy (CARE) package in January 2008 
(European Commission 2008e).4 The EU heads of state and government set 
out a clear timetable, recognising the CARE package as “a good starting 
point and basis for agreement” to be reached before the end of 2008 and to 
be ready for adoption in early 2009 at the latest (European Council, 2008). 
Meanwhile, a new strategy for EU industrial policy (European 
Commission, 2007) intends to create incentives to unlock the full potential 
of low carbon or resource-efficient goods, technologies and services in the 
EU to make Europe a ‘forerunner’ in these markets. The new strategy 
addresses the triple objective of competitiveness, energy and the 
environment, and calls for an integrated approach to mobilise action by all 
stakeholders. The main challenge is to explore how to move to a low-
carbon economy while aiding the competitiveness of European industry. 
From this perspective, the High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy 
and the Environment produced five reports from June 2006 to November 
2007.5 The reports recognise the need for: 
i)  specific measures to minimise the risk of carbon leakage in cost-
effective ways, especially in energy-intensive industries;  
ii)  flexibility and price certainty as provided through the liberalisation of 
energy markets and long-term energy supply contracts;  
iii)  getting the policy framework right, along with the urgency of 
stimulating the investment needed in the energy sector;  
iv)  ensuring that the investment signals provided through market 
mechanisms (the ETS and an international carbon market) are more 
long-term and predictable;  
                                                      
4  For further information, see the European Commission’s website and related 
articles under the heading “Climate Action” (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
energy/climate_actions/index_en.htm; and http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
climat/climate_action.htm). 
5 See the European Commission’s website and related articles under the heading 
“Sustainable Development, Climate Change and Competitiveness” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/environment/index_en.htm). MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 17 
 
v)  a more strategic approach to technology development and 
deployment through a combination of technology push and pull; and  
vi)  global sectoral approaches to help progress international action.  
Against this background, CEPS has convened a Task Force to identify 
a number of concrete measures for combating climate change that could 
reduce GHG emissions while at the same time stimulating structural 
change and technology diffusion. This Task Force report builds on the 
existing literature that has identified a number of policies and measures 
that could simultaneously accelerate structural change and improve cost-
effectiveness.6 In general, it calls for action-based approaches that can play 
an important role in achieving the emission reduction targets of the Kyoto 
Protocol and in putting into place the infrastructure, technologies and 
experience needed. With a view towards a long-term climate strategy, it 
attempts to present a portfolio of actions that can be implemented and 
accelerated on a global scale, especially in the G8+5 countries and the EU.  
After setting the context for actions against climate change in chapter 
1, chapter 2 highlights the importance of long-term structural change for 
the global low-carbon economy. Chapter 3 lists some crucial policies to 
accelerate structural change and to enable an action-based system to work. 
Chapter 4 draws brief conclusions.  
The main findings of the report are contained in the Executive 
Summary, including its sections on key messages and recommendations.  
The report has five appendices. Appendix 1 illustrates a global cost 
curve for GHG abatement measures beyond business-as-usual levels. 
Appendix 2 compares shares of world GHG emissions, per capita 
emissions and GHG intensity in the G8+5 countries. Appendix 3 
summarises the major global partnerships on energy and climate change, 
listing their main participants. Appendix 4 introduces the Report of the 
Transport Sub-group. Appendix 5 presents a list of members of the Task 
Force and invited guests and speakers. 
                                                      
6 This includes, for example, the ‘wedges approach’ (Pacala & Socolow, 2004), the 
WBCSD pathways study (WBCSD, 2005 and 2006), the Stern (2007) review on 
climate change and most recently, the McKinsey study undertaken on behalf of 
Vattenfall (Vattenfall, 2006) as well as a CEPS study that examines the costs and 
benefits of various technology options (Egenhofer et al., 2006). 18 | 
 
 
1.  SETTING THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION 
TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE 
o meet the considerable challenge of reducing GHG emissions and 
stabilising atmospheric concentrations to avoid ‘dangerous climate 
change’ will require a combination of initiatives and policies 
integrating global action under UNFCCC with domestic actions and 
international cooperation.  
1.1  The state of the climate and pathways towards long-term 
stabilisation 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), there 
is persuasive evidence that most of the temperature rise that has occurred 
over the last 50 years is attributable to human activity. As GHG 
concentrations continue to increase, the potential impact of GHG emissions 
on people and ecosystems may prove to be significant. In their contribution 
to the Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, Working Group 1 of the IPCC 
highlights the unprecedented level of observed climate change. For the next 
two decades, it projects a rise of about 0.2°C per decade across a range of 
emission scenarios. And even with the concentrations of all GHGs and 
aerosols being kept constant at year 2000 levels, a rise of about 0.1°C per 
decade could be anticipated. The same body finds that this is likely to 
trigger serious consequences for humanity and other forms of life. 
Ramifications include a rise in sea levels, thus endangering coastal areas 
and small islands, as well as provoking a greater frequency of extreme 
weather events, impacts on agricultural production and higher incidences 
of the spread of diseases, damage to infrastructure or migration.  
The principal source of global GHG emissions is CO2, on which this 
report concentrates. Roughly speaking, about 60% of total GHG emissions 
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come from the use of fossil fuels and 20% from land-use changes, e.g. 
deforestation. The rest is attributed to GHGs other than CO2.  
Global atmospheric CO2 concentration has grown, rising from a pre-
industrial value of about 280 ppm to 379 ppm in 2005. Annual fossil CO2 
emissions have increased from an average of 23.5 GtCO2 per year in the 
1990s to 26.4 GtCO2 per year in 2000–05. Based on the current 
understanding of climate carbon-cycle feedback, model studies suggest that 
stabilising CO2 at 450 ppm would require reductions of cumulative 
emissions over the 21st century from an average of approximately 2,460 
GtCO2 to around 1,800 GtCO2 (IPCC, Working Group 1, 2007). In response 
to this challenge, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) (2005) illustrated how a world with global carbon emissions at or 
below 33 GtCO2 7  per year could be realised by 2050, stabilising CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere at no more than 550 ppm and made clear 
the magnitude of changes that would have to take place. A study by 
McKinsey on behalf of Vattenfall (Vattenfall, 2006) has identified more than 
30 measures that can be undertaken at a CO2 price of up to €50 per tonne 
(see Appendix 1).  
1.2  The G8+5 countries and the EU 
The G8+5 countries – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
UK and the US plus Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa – are 
responsible for about 55% of global GHG emissions (see Appendix 2). The 
G8 countries are currently responsible for some 63% of world GDP (Federal 
Government of Germany, 2007b). Even so, the emerging economies are 
rapidly closing the gap. The IMF expects that by 2015, China will outpace 
Europe in terms of its share of global GDP, with China accounting for 19% 
and Europe for 17% (Federal Government of Germany, 2007a).  The 
significance of increasing emissions from the five emerging economies, 
especially China, is discussed further in chapter 2.  
An agreement by the G8+5 countries on policies and measures could 
constitute a major step forward not only because they account for a large 
                                                      
7 WBCSD(2005) expresses emissions in tonne of carbon but this report expresses 
emissions data in tonne of carbon dioxide. Thus, 9 GtC is converted to 33GtCO2, 
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share of the global economy but also because they could exert leadership in 
the regions for which they stand. The G8+5 group can be seen as a 
microcosm of the broader global picture. Appendix 2 shows that within the 
G8+5 group, there are major differences between countries in terms of 
shares of GHG emissions (Figure A2.1), per capita emissions (Figure A2.2) 
and GHG intensity (GHG emissions per unit of GDP) (Figure A2.3). Among 
these indicators, the intensity indicator requires careful treatment because it 
tends to reflect the structure of energy production rather than consumption. 
For example, Canada scores higher in energy intensity than does the US, 
even though the majority of energy produced in the former tends to be 
consumed in the latter.8  
The share of the EU25 in global CO2 emissions is relatively small, 
currently standing at 15% (see Figure A2.2, Appendix 2). Politically, 
however, the EU has been one of the most vocal advocates for combating 
global climate change and for leading global efforts towards a global 
climate-change agreement. At the same time, the EU is playing a key role in 
the development of emerging carbon markets, in both running the world’s 
largest allowance market (see Table 1) and generating considerable 
demand for clean development mechanism (CDM) credits (Capoor & 
Ambrosi, 2007, p. 22). 
Table 1. Carbon market at a glance, volumes and values in 2005–06 
 2005  volume 
(MtCO2e) 
2005 value  
($ million) 
2006 volume 
(MtCO2e) 
2006 value 
 ($ million) 
Allowances       
EU ETS  321  7,908  1,101  24,357 
New South 
Wales 
6  59  20  225 
Chicago Climate 
Exchange 
1  3  10  38 
UK ETS  0  1  na  Na 
Sub-total 328  7,971  1,131  24,620 
                                                      
8 Canada is the single largest foreign supplier of energy to the US, providing 17% 
of US oil imports and meeting 18% of the US demand for natural gas (see the 
website of the US Department of State, “Background Note: Canada”, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm). MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 21 
 
Project-based transactions      
Primary CDM  341  2,417  450  4,813 
Secondary CDM  10  221  25  444 
Joint implemen-
tation 
11  68  16  141 
Other 
compliance 
20  187  17  79 
Sub-total 382  2,894  508  5,477 
Total 710  10,864  1,639  30,098 
Source: Capoor & Ambrosi (2007), Table 1, p. 3.  
1.3  International processes for discussions or negotiations 
The UN plays a central role in developing a coordinated approach to 
climate change. Given the complexity of the matter as well as the lack of 
agreement within the UN, recently there have been additional attempts at 
better international coordination. This section provides an overview of UN 
processes and additional initiatives. While this section concentrates on 
processes for discussions or negotiations, any substance brought on the 
agenda of these processes is addressed in the next section, 1.4.  
UN processes 
Under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol processes, two major 
discussion tracks are currently running in parallel (e.g. Carter et al., 2008; 
Höhne et al., 2008). 
Ad-hoc Working Group (AWG)  
The AWG on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties consists of parties 
that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. It is expected to consider 
commitments for the post-2012 period for Annex I Parties under the 
Protocol (Art. 3.9) with a view to ensuring that there is no gap between the 
first and second commitment periods. The AWG has discussed the costs 
and benefits of current and future policies, measures and technologies, 
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Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
It was agreed in December 2007 to set up the AWG-LCA as a follow-up 
process to the Dialogue on Long-term Cooperative Action to address 
climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention. The 
Dialogue resulted in a series of exploratory workshops under four broad 
themes – sustainable development, adaptation, technology potential and 
market-based opportunities – some of which have become possible 
building blocks for a post-2012 agreement. The AWG-LCA is mandated to 
launch a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained 
implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action 
up to and beyond 2012. The new body must complete its work by the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (COP15) in December 2009. 
The first meeting, which took place in Bangkok, Thailand from 31 March to 
4April 2008, set out the work plan for implementing the Bali Action Plan. 
Comparability of effort has been high on the agenda. This meeting 
acknowledged the importance of comparability supported by an agreed 
yardstick (for comparability of effort, see section 1.4).  
Initiatives and activities contributing to the UN processes 
With the intention of complementing the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
processes, a series of other initiatives and activities have also been 
undertaken, mainly within existing international fora including the G8. For 
a summary of the major global partnerships on energy and climate change, 
see Appendix 3, Tables A3.1-4. These initiatives can contribute to the UN 
processes not only by allowing for exchanges of information about 
respective climate and energy policies, but also by fostering international 
cooperation on key aspects (e.g. energy efficiency). 
G8+5 and the Globe G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue 
During the UK’s G8 presidency in 2005, the G8 countries agreed on the 
Gleneagles Plan of Action on clean energy and climate change, which 
explicitly includes five emerging economies: Brazil, China, India, Mexico 
and South Africa. The World Bank and the IEA have been tasked with the 
research, planning and knowledge dissemination for the implementation of 
the Gleneagles Plan of Action. The final report will be submitted to the 
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Moreover, the GLOBE9 G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue, launched to 
shadow the G8 process, is expected to ensure input from stakeholders 
including business10  and environmental non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). The fifth meeting of their Legislators Forum will convene in the 
Japanese Parliament in June 2008.  
Major Economies Meetings 
The Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change is 
an initiative by the US to develop and contribute to a post-2012 framework 
on energy security and climate change.11 The third meeting in France in 
April 2008 (marking the first shift of the venue from the US) focused on 
sectoral approaches for addressing climate change. 
Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate  
The Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate12 focuses 
on sector-specific approaches and technology cooperation. The Partnership 
envisages international cooperation involving both the public and private 
sectors (i.e. a public–private partnership) with the principal aim of 
developing and diffusing technologies mainly through technology push 
(see section 3.3).  
Bilateral or multilateral partnerships  
Lastly, there have been attempts to explore bilateral or multilateral 
partnerships that are specific to individual topics such as CCS, biofuels, 
renewables and energy efficiency (see Appendix 3, Tables A3.1-4).  
                                                      
9 GLOBE stands for the Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced 
Environment, an organisation comprising legislators across the world, including 
G8+5 countries. 
10 The WBCSD has been active in putting climate change policy on the mainstream 
business agenda. Its output includes the pathways study (WBCSD, 2005) quoted in 
section 1.1. 
11 The invited countries, entities and organisations are Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South 
Korea, South Africa, the UK, the EU, the European Commission and the UN.  
12 The members are Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and the US. For an overview, see Fujiwara (2007). 24 | SETTING THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
1.4  Building blocks for a post-2012 agreement  
In the course of ongoing discussions in the UN processes and additional 
initiatives, some main themes appear to have developed into possible 
building blocks for a post-2012 agreement with various degrees of support 
from participating countries and organisations. This section covers 
adaptation, avoided deforestation and sectoral approaches. Equally 
important are carbon markets and technology, which are introduced in 
sections 3.1 to 3.3. 
Adaptation  
Irrespective of the intensity of a global response to climate change, there 
will be a need for adaptation to climate change. Adaptation measures in 
many cases will provide local benefits without taking long lead times, even 
before mitigation measures can have an effect. Depending on the 
temperature changes that occur, the costs of adaptation will rise sharply. 
Stern (2007) estimates them to be in the range of $15-150 billion each year 
(0.05-0.5% of GDP) for the construction of new infrastructure and buildings 
resilient to climate change in OECD countries. The World Bank (2006) 
estimates that the costs of ‘climate proofing’ and investment amounts to 
between $10 billion and $40 billion annually. The UNFCCC (2007) 
calculates that the additional investment and financial flows needed for 
adaptation in the infrastructure will total $2-41 billion for non-Annex I 
Parties and $8-130 billion globally in the year 2030. The challenge of 
adaptation will be even more acute in developing countries, which are 
vulnerable to climate change but short of resources to implement 
adaptation measures, meaning that there will need to be major transfers of 
money from developed to developing countries.  
Avoided deforestation  
Deforestation amounts to 18% of CO2 emissions globally – more than the 
share of the global transport sector (Stern, 2007). In some cases, CO2 
emissions related to land-use change and forestry are not included in 
emissions figures because of uncertainties associated with their calculation. 
Nevertheless, they matter in a global perspective, since CO2 emissions from 
land-use change and forestry are a principal source of emissions in 
countries such as Indonesia and Brazil. Avoiding deforestation can be a 
cost-effective policy. It is estimated that the opportunity cost of forest MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 25 
 
protection (e.g. avoiding deforestation) in eight countries accounting for 
70% of emissions from land use could be about $5 billion per year initially, 
with marginal costs rising over time (Stern, 2007). Yet again, as is the case 
for adaptation, action would require commitment to the immediate release 
of finance from developed countries.  
Sectoral approaches 
Sectoral approaches have rapidly become the focus of post-2012 discussions, 
but exactly what they mean and what they can deliver remain unanswered. 
There have been proposals for several types of sectoral approaches. One 
type is an industry-led “sector-wide transnational approach” to 
commitments (Baron, 2006; Baron et al., 2007). The Bali Action Plan 1(b) (iv) 
calls for consideration of “cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-
specific actions”. Another type is a government-led approach as a method 
or tool for setting country- or region-based targets founded on an analysis 
of mitigation potentials, which has been explored in AWG workshops.13 
The Bali Action Plan 1(b)(i) proposes for consideration “measurable, 
reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or 
action, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, 
by all developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of 
efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national 
circumstances”. For elucidation, a “sector-wide transnational approach” is 
introduced in section 3.5, simply referred to ‘sectoral approaches’. This 
section only covers the concept of sectoral approaches as a method of 
setting country-based targets or, more broadly, as a basis for developed 
countries to take on “measurable, reportable and verifiable” commitments 
or action with a view to ensuring the comparability of efforts.  
It can be foreseen that countries will make their own commitments in 
the absence of globally agreed and coordinated commitments. Some 
countries may strongly focus on domestic policies, including technology 
standards, renewable or energy-efficiency commitments, domestic trading 
schemes and policies targeting the domestic or transport sectors. Other 
countries or regions such as the EU may prefer legally binding 
                                                      
13 For further information, see the UNFCCC website (http://unfccc.int/ 
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commitments in the form of absolute or intensity targets. Given the 
uncertainty about a post-2012 agreement, despite an urgent need to reduce 
emissions, some governments and many stakeholders have shown an 
increasing interest in action-based approaches. The advantages of such 
approaches are that they can be implemented here and now – without 
waiting until a global agreement can be found – and they will reduce 
emissions. The outcome, however, will most likely be a more complex and 
decentralised system, leading to questions about the comparability of 
efforts.  
The comparability of efforts will depend on the existence of some sort 
of agreed or common yardstick, against which the progress of domestic 
measures can be assessed. In the absence of a common yardstick, there will 
be a risk of continuous finger-pointing that one country is doing more than 
another. An example of such a yardstick is the IEA energy indicators.14 
While the comparability of efforts is a necessary condition for making an 
action-based system work, it is not sufficient on its own. Countries that 
have pledged emission reductions need to know in advance that they will 
be held responsible for achieving what they pledge and for accepting the 
eventual consequences for non-compliance or lack of performance. 
Provided the comparability of measures is ensured and that there is a 
shared understanding about the consequences of (non-)compliance or lack 
of performance, country or regional commitments based on national or 
regional priorities may yield at least some measurable reductions. 
Nevertheless, there is a risk that proliferating actions in many countries 
will lead to ever-diverging approaches, which could make reaching a 
global agreement more difficult. The biggest risk of such a system, however, 
would appear to be that countries or regions are invited to pick and choose.  
                                                      
14  For further information, see the IEA website (http://www.iea.org/Textbase 
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2.  LONG-TERM STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
FOR THE GLOBAL LOW-CARBON 
ECONOMY 
he demand for primary energy is projected to increase globally by a 
factor of 1.6 to 3.5 between now and 2050 and in non-OECD 
countries by a factor of 2.3 to 5.2 (World Bank, 2006). The estimates 
of the IEA’s reference scenario put the investment needs of the energy 
sector in developing countries at an average cost of $300 billion per year for 
the period 2003–30, of which 65% is for the electricity sector alone. 
According to the WETO-H2 reference projection, energy consumption in 
developing countries will overtake that of developed countries shortly after 
2010 and will account for two-thirds of the world total in 2050 (European 
Commission, 2006a).  
The World Bank (2006) holds that developing countries need an 
annual investment for electricity supply of $165 billion through to 2010, 
increasing at 3% per year to 2030. There is currently a large financing gap in 
the energy sector of about $80 billion per year, or about 50% of the actual 
needs for electricity generation. The under-investment in energy is 
estimated to reduce GDP growth in some countries by as much as 1–4% per 
annum. International financial institutions, donors and foreign direct 
investment can help fill the gap by about $10 billion per year with existing 
instruments (World Bank, 2006). Closing the remaining gap will depend on 
the pace of implementing sector reforms to attract private investment.  
Experience suggests that primary energy use in developing countries 
can be cut by 30–50%, because the cost of energy savings is negligible 
compared with the cost of increasing energy supply. Therefore, accelerating 
cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency will be a priority in 
increasing energy supply. While energy intensity started declining mostly 
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as a result of structural changes in developing countries and economies in 
transition, much of the technical potential across the supply, transmission 
and use of energy is still to be tapped (World Bank, 2007). 
The costs of reducing GHG emissions can be further lowered through 
increased end-use energy efficiency, a multi-gas/multi-sector strategy, 
international emissions trading or the carbon markets in general (World 
Bank, 2006).  
Nevertheless, without changes in policy frameworks and appropriate 
instruments to facilitate investment in new technologies, developing 
countries are likely to follow a carbon-intensive development path. 
Developing countries are believed to account for over three-quarters of the 
increase in global CO2 emissions between 2004 and 2030 in the IEA 
reference scenario. The share of developing countries in global CO2 
emissions will rise from 39% in 2004 to over 50% by 2030. Their share of 
global CO2 emissions is growing faster than their share of energy demand 
because their incremental energy use is more carbon-intensive than that of 
the OECD and transition economies (IEA, 2006a).  
There are strong pressures on emerging economies for the quick 
expansion of energy supply, notably for power generation and transport 
fuels. Although there is little scope for substituting oil as the principal fuel 
in transport, power can be generated by a variety of fuels such as natural 
gas, nuclear power, renewables, coal, and combined heat and power (CHP), 
which has a high degree of efficiency. These economies are scrambling to 
meet growing demand for generation capacity very quickly. They are often 
doing so by using the existing capital stock and technology and by making 
use of domestic reserves of coal, wherever possible, in spite of the higher 
recurrent costs at a later stage through efficiency losses and local or 
regional environmental damage. There is a major risk of a lock-in of the 
power sector into coal. The investment taking place in the next 10–20 years 
could consequently lock in very high emissions for the next half-century 
(World Bank, 2006).  
China is the most striking example. According to the IEA (2004), coal-
fired power in China is estimated to rise to 560 GW by 2020 (from 247 GW 
in 2002). In the same period, China intends to ‘only’ install 67 GW in 
additional natural gas-fired power stations. The option of an additional 47 
GW of gas-fired generation based on combined cycle gas turbine plants 
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savings of around 213 million tonnes per year (Heller, 2006), or about half 
the Kyoto Protocol commitment of the EU-15.  
Other problems in developing countries range from domestic energy 
pricing (e.g. energy subsidies, fiscal policies to soften the impact of fuel 
supply scarcity on final consumer prices, the absence of differentiation 
according to the polluting potential of fuels) to government failure in the 
enforcement of environmental regulations or investment in untested 
technologies. Such factors can slow down the introduction of more efficient 
technologies that are already cost-effective in developed countries, e.g. 
supercritical boilers for coal-fired power stations. Moreover, low levels of 
capacity relative to demand make it difficult for operators to take plants 
offline to improve energy efficiency and delivery, with implications for 
local residents and industry. Hence, old and carbon-intensive infrastructure 
tends to remain in operation despite the cost-effectiveness of upgrading 
(Stern, 2007).15 
A special case is public infrastructure, which predetermines through 
its long lifespan production and consumption patterns over a long period. 
Decisions taken by governments today are highly influential in terms of 
reducing emissions for decades to come.  
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3.  CRUCIAL POLICIES FOR ACCELERATING 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
n the absence of a comprehensive global agreement, there are a number 
of crucial policies that have the potential to accelerate structural change. 
3.1  The role of a carbon price  
Within the EU and member states, there is already a plethora of policies – 
some of them imperfect – for setting a price on carbon. These include the 
EU ETS, member state taxes, and agreements between governments and 
industry. The UK, for example, has launched the Energy Performance 
Commitment scheme to target emissions from large entities such as 
supermarkets, hotels, and central and local government. It remains 
essential that a carbon price be eventually reflected in the price of the final 
product. Without a universal price on carbon, it is uncertain how far these 
efforts will spread to global commodities. 
A carbon price encourages businesses to take the least costly actions, 
for example, those aimed at energy-efficiency improvements. There may 
also be advantages for first-mover businesses, which can substantially 
reduce their carbon footprint. Consumers appear to increasingly demand 
low-carbon products.  
Nonetheless, carbon pricing alone is not sufficient. Even if the costs of 
climate change were borne directly by GHG emitters, leading to higher 
fossil-fuel prices, climate change is associated with market failures and 
barriers. The literature has identified a number of market deficiencies 
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related to the development and adoption of new technologies. 16 First, 
owing to ‘knowledge spillover’, innovating firms cannot keep other firms 
from also benefiting from their new knowledge and, therefore, cannot 
capture for themselves all the benefits of innovation. Second, there are 
‘adoption spillovers’, which imply that the cost or value of a new 
technology to one user may depend on how many other users have 
adopted the technology, and thus adoption is not as straightforward a 
matter as it appears. Third, market shortcomings arise through incomplete 
information. For example, incomplete information can be a barrier when a 
builder or landlord chooses the level of investment in energy efficiency in a 
building but a later purchaser or tenant pays the energy bills.  
Moreover, a problem may occur when factoring the cost of carbon in 
the cost of materials. It is possible that the entire carbon footprint is not 
always reflected for various reasons, for example because of different 
methodologies to account for inputs, including indirect emissions or the life 
cycle (e.g. production, subsequent recycling and the end of a product’s life). 
Finally, uncertainty associated with returns to investment in innovation is 
particularly significant. Based on these market deficiencies, methodological 
problems or uncertainty about investment, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the policy prescription of economists to ‘put a price’ on GHG emissions, 
thereby inducing individuals and firms to internalise the cost of 
environmental externalities, does not always unlock the full potential. This 
issue highlights the potential for non-pricing measures to play a 
complementary role. For instance, technology measures (see section 3.3) not 
only rely on pricing but also on government support for R&D as well as 
public procurement, product labelling and certification. Integrated 
approaches to transport (see section 3.6) are based on a combination of 
measures ranging from pricing to consumer information and driver 
training. 
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3.2  Carbon markets  
The Kyoto Protocol has attached major importance to carbon markets and 
has introduced international emissions trading alongside the CDMs and 
joint implementation (JI) (Arts. 6, 12 and 17) under the Protocol. 
Uncertainty about countries’ commitments after the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol (the ‘post-2012 period’) poses a challenge to 
the development and organisation of future carbon markets. Unless 
countries agree on rules for further commitments, there will be no assigned 
amount of units to parties beyond 2012. If there is no assigned amount of 
units approved by parties, each party may make its own commitment and 
any cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme will face the problem of 
finding the basis of cap-setting. Until there is a single carbon market on a 
global scale, emerging domestic and regional carbon markets will be likely 
to play an active role through their linking at least in the short term.  
Linking domestic and regional emissions trading schemes is possible. 
There are two main options for linking: government-driven linking 
through international agreements and market-driven linking resulting from 
traders’ search for arbitrage. While formal linking through international 
agreements may be an option for the long term, informal linking through 
arbitrage may be a preferred option in the short to mid-term. 
Linking through international agreements 
To date, a number of countries, states and provinces are developing 
concepts for emissions trading schemes. These include the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in north eastern American states and Canadian 
provinces and the Western Regional Climate Action Initiative (an 
international scheme encompassing California, western US states and 
Canadian provinces). Various proposals for a US cap-and-trade scheme 
have been submitted to the US Senate. In Australia, the National Emissions 
Trading Taskforce has proposed a national emissions trading scheme. 
These schemes exhibit design features that are significantly different from 
those of the EU ETS with regard to sector coverage, commitments, 
allocation and even monitoring, reporting and verification. The designs of 
these emissions trading schemes are driven by the respective conditions of 
the domestic political economies with little or no concern for the effects on 
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Linking as a result of traders’ search for arbitrage  
It is highly likely that participants in emissions trading schemes will search 
for arbitrage possibilities among carbon markets or commodities. Carbon 
prices will converge as long as most national or regional emissions trading 
schemes allow operators to use allowances generated through Kyoto 
Protocol project mechanisms (i.e. CDM/JI) or comparable domestic offset 
mechanisms for their compliance and there is sufficient volume of such 
allowances.  
After 2012, a few more commodities may be created through the 
introduction of new mechanisms. A sectoral crediting mechanism (SCM) 
could evolve from the CDM or be ‘implanted’ in the Kyoto Protocol 
framework as another flexibility mechanism (Baron & Ellis, 2006). Such a 
mechanism generates credits for emission reductions on a sectoral basis. 
The challenge is to match the magnitude of credits the SCM could generate 
with the demand for emission reductions. Against the risk of over-supply, 
Baron (2006) suggests that parties could agree to either discount the value 
of SCM credits or adopt baselines that are below business-as-usual ones, 
such as no-lose sectoral targets (Schmidt et al., 2006). If emerging 
economies agree to take up no-lose targets, these economies will in effect 
move from the CDM to a multilateral mechanism trading (green) assigned 
amount units. 
3.3  Technology  
Most of the (post-2012) climate literature stresses the crucial role of 
technology in stabilising GHG emission concentrations at low costs, the 
need for a portfolio of R&D investments across a spectrum of technologies 
and integration of energy technology development as part of a larger and 
comprehensive climate-change strategy (e.g. Humphreys, 2001; Edmonds, 
2003; Barrett, 2002 and 2003; Stern, 2007).17  
In general, the costs of new and carbon-saving technologies tend to 
fall over time. The cost reduction can be achieved through three main 
approaches: i) carbon pricing in the form of taxes or emissions trading; ii)  
government support for research, development, demonstration and, in 
some sectors, early-stage deployment of technology; and iii) measures that 
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create conditions that enable consumers to choose clean technologies. For 
example, public procurement can be used to create the critical mass for 
market penetration (e.g. ‘green procurement’) while product labelling and 
certification can inform consumers about the best choices. Furthermore, 
governments could promote actions such as trade policies, the removal of 
technical, legal and administrative barriers to technology transfer, sound 
economic policies, regulatory frameworks and transparency – all of which 
create an environment conducive to private and public technology transfer.  
Technology-oriented agreements (TOAs) have the potential to 
address important failures in the market with respect to technological 
innovation (e.g. de Coninck et al., 2007). Examples of such agreements are 
renewable energy quotas or feed-in tariffs but also EU or global energy 
efficiency or car efficiency standards. Still, they will operate best in 
conjunction with appropriate policies aimed at emission reductions, 
particularly market-based ones. TOAs could be negotiated separately or 
linked together, or incorporated into a national climate-change policy. 
TOAs that are more modest can be negotiated and implemented by a 
smaller set of countries, potentially outside the UNFCCC (see Appendix 3, 
Tables A3.1-4).  
On the other hand, TOAs could become an effective substitute for an 
emissions-based strategy focusing on a limited category of standards, 
mandates or substantial incentives that could be applied on a sector-by-
sector or a technology-by-technology basis. This approach may make the 
most sense for specific sectors or settings: sectors that are highly trade-
sensitive, in which reaching agreements on targets and timetables is likely 
to be too difficult; sectors not otherwise covered by policies aimed at 
emission reductions; sectors that can benefit from international 
coordination; and situations in which significant ancillary benefits are 
foreseen.  
Arguably, new technologies are most likely to evolve in not only 
developed countries but also in some emerging economies. Implementation 
of effective R&D and policies targeting emission reductions are crucial to 
the long-term success of technology development. Climate-friendly 
technologies will benefit all countries including developing and transition 
ones. For the latter, problems related to poverty, limited capacity and 
governance among others loom larger as barriers than the market failures. 
Thus, it is naïve to expect the aforementioned market-based strategies for 
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countries to generate similar effects in developing and transition 
economies. 
For the least-developed countries, access to technology is a key issue. 
Arrangements for technology finance could be considered together with 
the funding of avoided deforestation or adaptation as a package deal (see 
section 1.4). On the other hand, some emerging economies need 
concession-based finance for wider technology cooperation on a larger 
scale. Concessionary finance could be one of the instruments used to ensure 
low-carbon investment in these economies.18 Carbon markets could finance 
some of the investment needs foreseen in the long term. Yet the revenues 
expected from their contributions will probably be insufficient, certainly in 
the short term, which requires additional resources.  
3.4  Energy  
There are a number of non-market barriers to the uptake of new supply 
and distribution technologies such as political acceptability, potential safety 
questions and the lack of a regulatory framework. Among these, the most 
important barrier in the EU to further diffusion of more efficient and low-
carbon technologies concerns energy prices. Such technologies would be 
expected to come to the market as a result of a significantly higher carbon 
price. Which technologies will be able to penetrate the market depends 
inter alia on fuel costs, including those resulting from the climate constraint 
(i.e. carbon prices) as well as on the development of capital costs (see 
section 3.1). It is difficult to forecast price developments that depend, to 
some degree, on learning effects, i.e. cost reductions stemming from the 
deployment of technologies. Herein lies the reason for governments to 
‘force’ through policies on the deployment of technologies, for example, for 
renewables or possibly CCS. There is a risk that the absence of a significant 
carbon price or subsidies will lock new investment into an unsustainable 
future. On the other hand, there is a risk that such deployment policies will 
create vested interests seeking economic rent from government regulation.  
                                                      
18 The World Bank (2006) has estimated that up to $30 billion per year would be 
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Natural gas  
The combined cycle gas turbine is already the most successful power 
generation technology, with its share in the EU expected to be 22% by 2030. 
Further improvements in thermal efficiency from a current 53–59% or even 
63% are feasible. The gas turbine cycle for CHP also has the potential to 
achieve further improvements in both electric and steam conversion of up 
to 2%. 
Coal 
According to IEA or the European Commission, new coal-generation 
technologies (i.e. supercritical coal power, integrated gasification combined 
cycle and direct coal-fired combined cycle plants) can achieve conversion 
efficiency of 50% or more as opposed to current efficiency, which is around 
40%.  
Carbon capture and storage  
One might expect that coal burning will continue to generate high levels of 
emissions because major developed and developing countries are expected 
to continue to rely, for security of supply, on fossil fuels (mainly coal) to 
generate power. Nonetheless, fossil fuels can be used with minimal 
atmospheric CO2 emissions, but only on the condition that the CO2 is 
captured and stored in geological structures. This idea has sparked interest 
in existing techniques of post-, pre- and oxy-fuel combustion. The 
European Council has endorsed the European Commission’s (2007 and 
2008) proposals for a carbon capture and sequestration policy. The 
Commission has proposed a legal and policy framework for carbon capture 
and geological storage as well as an incentive framework, support 
programmes and external elements such as technology cooperation with 
key countries on CCS (European Commission, 2008d).  
Renewables  
The uptake of emerging and future technologies (e.g. new renewables such 
as wind, biomass and photovoltaic (PV)) depends on their competitiveness 
with existing technologies. Policies can play an important role, however, by 
bringing down costs through R&D subsidies along with support 
mechanisms that ensure a certain level of market penetration. Increased MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 37 
 
market penetration has historically contributed to reducing costs (i.e. the 
learning-curve concept). According to the IEA, renewables are no different 
from other technologies in their potential for cost savings. A doubling of 
the capacity reduces costs by 10–20% (Jansen et al., 2005).  
Nuclear power 
In principle, nuclear power will be a potential source of GHG emission 
reductions over the next 50 years. With a market share of 32% for the EU-
25, the potential for nuclear power to avoid emissions ranges between 700 
million tonnes of CO2 – if the share of nuclear power were to be replaced by 
the current energy mix – and 300 million tonnes of CO2 if nuclear power 
were to be replaced by gas. Yet at present, nuclear power faces stagnation 
and, according to most forecasts, decline. The main reasons for stagnation 
and decline are costs, safety, waste and proliferation.  
District heating and cooling, combined heat and power 
District heating and cooling (DHC) can make an important contribution to 
improvements in the efficiency of buildings in terms of both the quality of 
the energy feeding a building and the building itself. Building owners can 
take measures at the building level while considering energy supply. The 
integrated production of heat and power achieves a considerably higher 
primary energy conversion than separate generation. A typical efficiency 
value for CHP is approximately 85% for the combined heat and electricity 
generation, compared to a typical efficiency value for conventional thermal 
electricity-only plant of 35-45% and for heat only boilers of up to 90%. Even 
so, a difference in (diurnal) demand patterns for heat and power constrains 
the scope for operating such a capacity in a flexible manner.  
The crucial value of district heating lies in further development of 
renewable energy sources. It is important to underline the role of district 
heating as an infrastructure to use surplus heat from efficient electricity 
production (e.g. CHP, surplus heat from the incineration of municipal 
waste or industrial processes). 
The demand for comfort cooling is experiencing very high growth in 
Europe and elsewhere. This demand is generally met by an electricity-
driven system, which often puts strains on electricity networks (e.g. peak 
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over refrigerant gases. Another solution is district cooling, which enables 
the use of surplus heat and the intake of renewable energy sources. 
3.5  Sectoral approaches  
Sectoral approaches to address climate change focus on the need for global 
coordination (Egenhofer and Fujiwara 2008), be it voluntary cooperation or 
coordination or a post-2012 framework to account for the transnational 
character of the industries. Such approaches have been promoted for more 
than one reason. Recently there have been increasing concerns with (the 
lack of) a level-playing field, shared by energy-intensive industries 
producing goods in countries subject to carbon constraints but trading on a 
global commodity market. While sectoral cooperation can moderate 
competitiveness concerns, it adds complexity and requires a careful 
balancing act to deal with potential winners and losers. On the other hand, 
emerging economies would be interested in sectoral approaches as an 
additional driver to accelerate technology and financial transfer from 
developed countries. The key is to engage not only governments but also 
industry in emerging economies. An example is sectoral cooperation on 
improving the performance of the least-efficient companies.  
To date, much of the progress so far work has been attributed to 
industry-led sectoral approaches. Existing industry-led sectoral approaches 
remain bottom-up in collecting information about the status of a sector, e.g. 
performance benchmarking. Therefore, they can put national policies and 
measures as well as international negotiations onto a firmer footing in at 
least several different ways: identifying win–win mitigation options, 
discovering hitherto unknown abatement potentials in developed and 
emerging economies, and realising cost-effective solutions based on the 
sound knowledge of an industry.  
As sectoral approaches emerge and their likely designs evolve, 
discussions have shifted from concept to practice. Questions about how 
they can fit into existing policies and practices grow more urgent. New 
initiatives such as sectoral approaches will most likely be expected to 
complement existing frameworks rather than replace them.  
Sectoral approaches could constructively interact with EU policy 
priorities to a significant extent and thereby increase support from both 
governments and stakeholders in four ways. These relate to collecting data 
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•  Sectoral performance benchmarks can be used for setting a cap if they 
are based on best practice or the best available technology in a sector. 
•  Sectoral benchmarks can be also used for allocation at least as long as 
free allocation continues. 
•  The linking of emissions trading schemes could be facilitated and 
accelerated by coordination in central design options such as cap-
setting, (free) allocation and monitoring, reporting and verification. 
Sectoral approaches can aid this kind of coordination. 
•  Sectoral performance benchmarks could be a useful tool for the 
monitoring, reporting and verification of actions and extended to a 
possible sectoral CDM.  
3.6  An integrated approach to transport  
Transport services facilitate the movement of goods and services, stimulate 
economic growth and improve human welfare. Mobility is the backbone of 
economies and daily life. In 2000, transport contributed worldwide to 14% 
of global GHG emissions (Stern, 2007) or 21–25% of emissions from the 
energy sector in developed countries (IEA, 2006a). Within the EU, 93% of 
all transport emissions originate from road transport (EEA, 2007). Road 
transport emissions, especially those from goods transport, are projected to 
continue rising at the previous rate. From 1990 to 2004, goods transport 
grew by more than 50% (EEA, 2007). Nevertheless, there is better 
understanding that the world’s continuing and growing demand for 
mobility cannot be met simply by expanding today’s means of transport.  
The transport value chain is a complex matter, consisting of different 
components, including engine and vehicle technologies, fuels, 
infrastructure and drivers’ behaviour (see Appendix 4).19 As a result, any 
policy will have to tackle interaction among these different components in 
the transport value chain. The CAR21 High Level Group, a multi-
stakeholder group of EU and member states policy makers, NGOs and car 
industry, has advocated an integrated approach as a guarantee to achieving 
a given objective at the least societal cost. An integrated approach involves 
all the stakeholders in securing solutions to meet policy objectives. 
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There are two main challenges to an integrated approach. The first 
challenge is to define and find a balance among the contributions of the 
various components of the transport value chain. Uneven contributions by 
these components will risk undermining not only the least-cost goal but 
also, ultimately, political acceptability. Second, any such integrated 
approach faces the challenge of enforcing commitments on the part of the 
various components. The failure of one component, for example 
infrastructure or fuel quality, may have knock-on effects, leading to the 
underperformance of the entire transport sector.  
There are important precursors to integrated approaches such as the 
Auto-Oil Programme and European Climate Change Programme. In both 
cases, there has been significant involvement by all the stakeholders, 
although the Auto-Oil Programme has been criticised for its lack of 
representation of environmental NGOs. Any lessons from the programme 
would be concerned with the need for a high level of transparency and a 
good degree of access to data. An important element of the schemes has 
been comprehensive impact assessments, which could help to determine 
the cost-effectiveness of all available measures within the relevant sectors 
(e.g. automotives, fuel, drivers or consumers) and to prioritise such 
measures. It has become equally clear that in formulating measures, policy-
makers will most likely need to take into account cost-effectiveness as well 
as other criteria such as environmental value, political acceptability, 
affordability and technical feasibility. During the decision-making process, 
it is important that political actors are able to support the integrated 
approach through their activities and regulatory decisions, which requires 
the level of the commitments to result from the development of the 
approach. 
Each sector should strive to live up to its commitments while trusting 
in others’ delivery of commitments, and should be accountable for 
achieving compliance. Nonetheless, the critical tasks of enforcing policies 
and measures and achieving the overall environmental objectives remain in 
the hands of policy-makers. The tasks will most likely require clear 
provisions regarding accountability and compliance mechanisms. Those 
compliance mechanisms may also comprise the possibility to use project-
based mechanisms and reduce emissions in other regions or sectors, where 
abatement costs are lower. These aspects will be facilitated by a high level 
of concreteness, making the measurement of compliance easier. However, 
too high standards on measurement certainty must not exclude low-cost MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 41 
 
abatement potentials, but programmatic approaches should be applied 
where appropriate. 
The activities of the manufacturers can be measured against specific 
yardsticks as part of the common yardsticks discussed in section 1.4. For 
instance, the car industry participating in an integrated approach is 
responsible for continuous technological improvements in cars (see Table 
A4.1 in Appendix 4). Performance would be assessed against specific 
energy-efficiency targets, which should differ according to certain 
characteristics, like weight. In order to reduce costs, the manufacturers 
should be allowed maximum flexibility in complying with these targets. 
Similarly, fuel providers are responsible for providing high quality low-
carbon fuels. A proper yardstick could be the carbon intensity of fuel 
measured on a well-to-wheel basis. For governments, R&D support could 
serve as one indicator in the field of technology policy. Proper yardsticks 
for infrastructure and transport policy are more complex, but nevertheless 
possible (Box 2). Programmatic project approaches in the transport sector 
can also serve as an example for defining manageable indicators.  
 
Box 2. Urban transport indicators 
The Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (2007) has developed two indicators, 
which are termed “urban transport indicators”: a road indicator and an offset 
indicator. The road indicator is calculated for the purpose of identifying the 
major factors of passenger-vehicle energy consumption in urban areas. Three 
key variables are selected: the number of passenger vehicle stocks, road length 
and the average vehicle distance travelled. The road indicator is calculated as a 
weighted (50:20:30) average of each variable. The offset indicator is developed 
for the analysis of those factors that can reduce growth in urban passenger-
vehicle energy consumption. Here again, three variables are chosen: energy-
efficiency improvement for passenger vehicles, accessibility or rail or subway 
infrastructure and governance. The offset indicator is calculated as a weighted 
(30:40:30) average of each variable. Using these indicators, sets of data from 1995 
and 2005 in 10 Asian cities, (the changes in) city-specific contributing or 
offsetting factors to gasoline consumption are identified.  
Finally, measures of an integrated approach cannot be seen in 
isolation. They will be enhanced by pricing through fuel, registration and 
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effective package of measures to reduce GHG emissions stemming from 
transport, in conjunction with the yardsticks for measurement. 
Successful implementation of an integrated approach in the EU could 
become an example for other countries, as they consider similar approaches 
adapted to national circumstances.  
3.7  End-use energy efficiency 
The EU has committed itself to reducing 20% of its energy consumption 
compared with projections for 2020. To achieve this, the rate of energy-
efficiency improvements will need to more than double if compared with 
historic rates. The European Commission (2006b) estimates that savings of 
more than €100 billion annually by 2020 are realistic, given full 
implementation and enforcement of existing and future measures. The IEA 
(2006a) and IPCC Working Group 3 (2007) draw similar conclusions on the 
global level. In the ‘world alternative policy scenario’ formulated by the 
IEA (2006a), energy efficiency accounts for almost 80% of the avoided CO2 
emissions with the remainder stemming from fuel-switching. Greater 
efficiency in the use of fuels and electricity and in energy production 
accounts for about 36%, 30% and 13% respectively of the emissions saved 
(IEA, 2006a).  
The European Commission (2006b) has identified the building sector 
as a top priority. The building sector is estimated to have respective 
potential savings of 27% and 30% in residential and commercial buildings. 
Additional potential is estimated to lie in the transport sector (26%) and in 
the manufacturing industry (25%).  
Buildings including dwellings 
Globally, buildings contribute about 40% of the overall GHG emissions 
(WBCSD, 2007). There is a wide range of available techniques for 
insulation, heating, cooling, ventilation and lighting to reduce the carbon 
footprint from buildings. In the past, the main policy focus was on new 
buildings. While concentration on new, innovative low-energy and low-
GHG techniques for new buildings is crucial from an innovation point of 
view, it does not tackle the emissions from existing buildings. The 
European Commission has thus proposed to expand the scope of the 
Directive on the Energy Performance of Buildings (2002/91/EC) (European 
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minimum performance requirements for major renovations (European 
Commission, 2005). 
There is a consensus in the literature and among policy-makers that 
efforts towards energy efficiency and energy conservation in the domestic 
sectors face numerous barriers. These include a lack of information, which 
leads to inaction and disbelief among the wider public with respect to 
energy-saving issues. Another barrier is the complexity of the 
tenant/landlord relationship and its effects on long-term investment. 
Further obstacles are misleading prices, technical hurdles such as a lack of 
standardisation, a lack of (upfront) money, a lack of professional craftsmen 
and in some cases, a lack of regulation. Hence, solutions lie in a variety of 
approaches combining strengthened rules, the (re-)introduction of financial 
stimuli and better information campaigns. All these measures depend on 
well-defined policy packages, the integration of regulations, financial 
support and access to information. For the EU, where the principal 
competencies rest with the member states, an immediate way forward 
would be to screen and compare member state policies to identify best 
practices and, most importantly, to ensure implementation at member 
state, regional and local levels. This step requires an increase in resources in 
terms of both money and staff in EU administrations in addition to 
continued political commitment.  
Appliances 
It is estimated that improved domestic appliances could reduce energy 
consumption by 20–50%, often in cost-effective ways with a payback period 
of 10 years or less (e.g. Ecofys (2004), WBCSD (2007) and Egenhofer et al. 
(2006). According to the European Committee of Domestic Equipment 
Manufacturers (Mebane & Piccinno, 2006), the current best-available 
technology in appliances represents an improvement of up to 70% 
compared with the average energy consumption 10 years ago. This 
potential, however, is not reached or transformed into energy savings 
because of the long life cycle of domestic appliances. For instance, 22 Mt of 
CO2 emissions could be avoided in Europe every year by replacing 188 
million obsolete and energy-inefficient appliances that are 10 or more years 
old but are still in use. Globally, more than 500 million inefficient 
appliances are in use in developed country markets (Mebane & Piccinno, 
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Household appliances are also anticipated to be among the fastest-
growing sources of CO2 emissions in developing countries, notably in 
emerging economies. It is thought that in the next decade, several hundreds 
of millions of families around the world will buy and start to use 
appliances, meaning that more than a billion appliances could be put into 
use.  
This Task Force has identified the following key elements for a 
successful strategy on appliances:  
•  As in all other policy areas analysed above, the keys to success in 
end-use efficiency include undistorted energy prices (more 
specifically, electricity prices) reflecting the real energy costs, 
including the costs of carbon. In principle, this will give a market 
signal to consumers to buy appliances that are more efficient. This 
step alone, however, will not be enough. Additionally, consumers 
need to be informed about the economic and environmental 
consequences of their choices, e.g. through smart information and 
labelling campaigns. Yet such policies will only work if there are 
efficiency criteria for assessing new products, e.g. benefits from a life-
cycle perspective incorporating emissions from material use. 
International measurement standards would allow better 
comparisons of products while overcoming or even avoiding trade 
barriers owing to diverse technical standards developing in the 
different countries.  
•  One of the main obstacles to the diffusion of more efficient appliances 
has been the slow rate of replacement. This situation calls for 
programmes that encourage consumers to replace energy-inefficient 
equipment with highly energy-efficient products, especially with 
respect to cooling appliances such as refrigerators, which run 24 
hours. Such behaviour can (and will almost certainly have to) be 
facilitated by government incentive schemes. An open question is 
how such a government incentive scheme is best designed, e.g. 
whether it should target consumers or producers. Most existing 
schemes are directed at consumers through a subsidy at the point of 
sale or by other means. Another possibility would be tax credits for 
firms against the share of corporate income tax in proportion to the 
sales of appliances. The tax credits could be allocated for every 
supplementary appliance sold by a company in a given year that is 
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•  The challenge in emerging economies is considerable not only 
because of energy pricing, information campaigns and labelling, but 
also because of difficulties in governments’ additional funding for 
consumers to replace existing appliances with more efficient ones. 
Hence, added finance from external sources including international 
financial institutions might be needed.  
•  Finally, for developed and developing countries alike, a major 
challenge is the enforcement of existing rules.  46 | 
 
 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
he policy proposals developed in chapter 3 cover carbon markets, 
technology support, energy investment needs, sectoral approaches, 
integrated approaches and end-use efficiency improvements. Most of 
the proposals can be taken partly or wholly, alone or combined in a flexible 
manner. The proposals can be fed into political processes (e.g. the G8+5) 
supported by dialogues with civil society (e.g. the GLOBE G8+5 Climate 
Change Dialogue) or policy research delegated to international institutions 
(e.g. the IEA and World Bank) or both. 
As previously indicated, the IEA and the World Bank play a major 
role in implementing the Gleneagles Plan of Action.20  While the former 
continues to help governments to adopt measures for energy savings (e.g. 
IEA energy efficiency indicators, section 1.4) and new technology or to 
build up international technology cooperation, the latter, in close 
cooperation with the UNFCCC, has introduced the Clean Energy for 
Development Investment Framework (World Bank, 2006) and the Action 
Plan (World Bank, 2007). These two recent initiatives deserve particular 
attention. The World Bank Group Action Plan provides for an energy 
programme in response to the demands of the framework (see chapter 2 in 
this report). The Action Plan also supports the Africa Energy Scale-up Plan, 
the transition towards a low-carbon economy especially in emerging 
economies, and countries’ adaptation to climate variability and change. It 
furthermore explores options for enhanced financial products. The Action 
Plan is also committed to continued dialogue with governments and the 
                                                      
20   For further information, see the websites of the IEA and World Bank 
(http://www.iea.org/G8/index.asp), (http://www.worldbank.org/). See also 
IEA (2007). 
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private sector on new approaches to accelerate the transition towards a 
low-carbon economy. Similar messages have been delivered by the 
UNFCCC Dialogue on Long-term Cooperative Action in a report on the 
analysis of investment and financial flows (UNFCCC, 2007). Among other 
things, the report points to the role of private-sector investment, the 
demand for investment and financial flows to developing countries, 
improvement in and an optimal combination of mechanisms such as 
carbon markets, the UNFCCC financial mechanism, national policies, and 
in some cases, new and additional resources. Moreover, it looks into a 
variety of potential mitigation options on a sector basis ranging from 
energy supply and industry to buildings and transportation.  
Given the uncertainty about countries’ commitments in the post-
2012 period, the proliferation of domestic political actions, processes and 
the gradual development of (fragmented) carbon markets, there have been 
calls for a complementary focus on more action-oriented approaches, closer 
cooperation between governments and stakeholders, and research into 
potential options for sector-specific mitigation. These changes have been 
reflected not only in the implementation of the Gleneagles Plan of Action 
but also in the ways in which the UN processes are currently running. 
There seems to be an emerging consensus on a joint push for policies to 
accelerate structural change and transition towards a low-carbon economy, 
no matter how the post-2012 discussions develop. Such policies could and 
even should play a crucial role in influencing discussions on a global 
agreement in terms of direction, speed and depth. This report lists a set of 
policies that could accelerate structural change, namely, technology 
support, carbon markets, energy investment needs, sectoral approaches, 
integrated approaches and end-use efficiency improvements. Proposals for 
these policies could be incorporated into the existing political processes and 
in delegated policy research in a flexible manner. 
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AWG  Ad-hoc Working Group (on Further Commitments for Annex I 
Parties) 
AWG-LCA  Ad-hoc Working Group on a Long-term Cooperative Action Plan 
CARE  Climate action and renewable energy  
CCS  Carbon capture and storage 
CDM  Clean development mechanism 
CHP  Combined heat and power 
ETS Emissions  trading  scheme 
GHG Greenhouse  gas 
GLOBE  Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment 
GtC Gigatonne  of  carbon 
GtCO2  Gigatonne of carbon dioxide 
GW Gigawatt 
IEA International  Energy  Agency 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI Joint  implementation 
MtCO2e  Million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (quantities of GHGs) 
NGCC  Natural gas combined cycle (plants) 
NGO Non-governmental  organisation 
ppm  Parts per million 
SCM  Sectoral crediting mechanism 
TOA Technology-oriented  agreement 
UNFCCC  UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WBCSD  World Business Council for Sustainable Development  
WETO  World energy, technology and climate policy outlook (produced by 
the European Commission) 
WSSD  World Summit on Sustainable Development  
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APPENDIX 1. GLOBAL COST CURVE FOR 
GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT MEASURES 
Figure A1.1 Global costs of GHG abatement  
 
Source: Vattenfall (2006).  
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APPENDIX 2. SHARES OF WORLD GHG 
EMISSIONS, PER CAPITA EMISSIONS AND 
GHG INTENSITY IN G8+5 COUNTRIES 
 
Figure A2.1 Shares of world GHG emissions: EU-25, G8 and G8+5 
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Note: Based on data from 2003, the year for which the most recent data were available at the 
time of collection in August 2007. 
 
Sources: Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, UNFCCC; US EPA 2006 Global Anthropogenic 
Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions 1990-2020; OECD Environmental Data Compendium; 
and EDGAR 3.2 database, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. 56 | APPENDIX 2 
 
Figure A2.2 Shares of world GHG emissions by country/grouping 
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Note: Based on data from 2003, the year for which the most recent data were available at the 
time of collection in August 2007. 
Sources: Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, UNFCCC; US EPA 2006 Global Anthropogenic 
Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions 1990-2020; OECD Environmental Data Compendium; 
and EDGAR 3.2 database, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. 
Figure A2.3 GHG emissions per capita by country/grouping 
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Note: Based on data from 2003, the year for which the most recent data were available at the 
time of collection in August 2007. 
Sources: Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, UNFCCC; US EPA 2006 Global Anthropogenic 
Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions 1990-2020; OECD Environmental Data Compendium; 
and EDGAR 3.2 database, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 57 
 
Figure A2.4 GHG emissions by tonne per €1 million GDP by 
country/grouping 
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Note: Based on data from 2003, the year for which the most recent data were available at the 
time of collection in August 2007. 
Sources: Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, UNFCCC; US EPA 2006 Global Anthropogenic 
Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions 1990-2020; OECD Environmental Data Compendium; 
and EDGAR 3.2 database, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.   
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APPENDIX 3. MAJOR GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS 
ON ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Table A3.1 Major multilateral global partnerships on energy and climate change  
Partnerships Description 
Global Gas 
Flaring 
Reduction 
(GGFR) 
The GGFR is a World Bank-led initiative launched at the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). It is a 
public–private partnership, which facilitates and supports 
national efforts to use currently flared gas by promoting 
effective regulatory frameworks and tackling the constraints 
on gas utilisation. Poverty reduction is also an integral part of 
the programme (see http://www.cslforum.org/).  
Partnership for 
Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles (PCFV) 
The PCFV was also launched at the 2002 WSSD as a public–
private partnership. It seeks to reduce vehicular air pollution in 
developing countries through the promotion of clean fuels 
and vehicles. It has focused initially on the elimination of 
lead in gasoline and the phase-down of sulphur in diesel and 
gasoline fuels concurrent with the adoption of cleaner vehicle 
technologies (see http://www.unep.org/pcfv/). 
Johannesburg 
Renewable 
Energy 
Coalition 
(JREC) 
The JREC was launched following the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation agreed at the 2002 WSSD. Ministers and 
senior officials identified a large range of policy objectives 
that can be addressed through increased renewable energy 
policies and measures including objectives related to the 
environment, energy and development (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/jrec/index_en.htm). 
Carbon 
Sequestration 
Leadership 
Forum (CSLF) 
The CSLF focuses on the development of improved, cost-
effective technologies for the separation and capture of CO2 
for its transport and long-term safe storage. Launched in 
2003, its purpose is to make these technologies broadly 
available internationally and to identify and address wider 
issues relating to carbon capture and storage (see 
http://www.cslforum.org/). MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 59 
 
Table A3.1 continued 
Partnerships Description 
International 
Partnership for 
the Hydrogen 
Economy 
(IPHE) 
Launched in 2003, the IPHE aims at accelerating the 
transition to a hydrogen economy. It serves as a mechanism 
to organise effective, efficient and focused international 
research, development, demonstration and commercial 
utilisation activities related to hydrogen and fuel cell 
technologies (see http://www.iphe.net/).  
Methane to 
Markets 
Partnership 
(MMP) 
The Partnership is an initiative taken in 2004 to advance cost-
effective, near-term methane recovery and use as a clean 
energy source. Its goal is to reduce global methane emissions 
in order to enhance economic growth, strengthen energy 
security, improve air quality, improve industrial safety and 
reduce GHG emissions 
(see http://www.methanetomarkets.org/). 
FutureGen FutureGen  is  a  public–private partnership f o r m e d  i n  2 0 0 5  t o  
build a first-of-its-kind coal-fuelled, near-zero emissions 
power plant (see http://www.futuregenalliance.org/ 
about.stm).  
Renewable 
Energy and 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Partnership 
(REEEP) 
The REEEP was conceived at the 2002 WSSD and established 
in 2004. This public–private partnership organises policy and 
regulatory initiatives for clean energy and facilitates 
financing for energy projects. Its aim is to accelerate the 
integration of renewables into the energy mix and to 
advocate energy efficiency as a path to improved energy 
security and reduced carbon emissions, ensuring socio-
economic benefits (see http://www.reeep.org/). 
Generation-IV 
International 
Forum (GIF) 
In the GIF, countries work together to lay the groundwork 
for the 4th generation nuclear reactor, Generation IV (see 
http://gif.inel.gov/). 
Global Nuclear 
Energy 
Partnership 
(GNEP) 
First announced in 2006, the GNEP seeks to develop a 
worldwide consensus on enabling the expanded use of clean, 
safe and affordable nuclear energy to meet growing 
electricity demand. It proposes a nuclear fuel cycle that 
enhances energy security (see http://www.gnep.gov/).  
Source: Fujiwara (2007). 60 | APPENDIX 3 
 
Table A3.2 Major bilateral global partnerships on energy and climate change 
Partnership Description 
US Fossil Energy 
Bilateral 
Agreements 
The formats and goals for these agreements are set 
bilaterally (http://fossil.energy.gov/international/ 
International_Partners/International_Partners.html). 
US ENERGY STAR 
agreements 
There are international agreements to promote certain 
ENERGY STAR-qualified products. These aim at unifying 
voluntary energy-efficiency labelling programmes in 
major global markets and making it easier for partners to 
participate by providing a single set of energy-efficiency 
qualifications (see http://www.energystar.gov/ 
index.cfm?c=partners.intl_implementation). 
International 
Nuclear Energy 
Research Initiative  
(I-NERI) 
The US I-NERI programme is designed to foster 
collaborative R&D with international partners in 
advanced nuclear energy systems. It has implemented 
bilateral collaborative agreements (see 
http://www.energetics.com/ineri_client/index.aspx). 
EU bilateral 
cooperation 
initiatives  
The formats and goals for these initiatives are set 
bilaterally (see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
energy_transport/international/index_en.htm). 
Source: Fujiwara (2007). 
Table A3.3 Multilateral global partnerships and their main participants 
  G8 G8 G8 G8 G8 G8 G8  G8  +5  +5  +5  +5  +5   
  CA FR DE IT  JA RU UK US BR CH IN ME SA EU 
GGFR  ○  ○      ●  ○  ○         ○ 
PCFV  ●            ●  ●    
JREC   ●  ●  ●    ●  ●      ●  ● 
CSLF  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
IPHE  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●    ● 
MMP  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●    MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 61 
 
Table A3.3 continued 
  G8 G8 G8 G8 G8 G8 G8  G8  +5  +5  +5  +5  +5   
  CA FR DE IT  JA RU UK US BR CH IN ME SA EU 
REEEP  ○  ●  ○  ○  ●  ○  ○  ●    ●  ●  ○ 
GIF  ●  ●    ●  ●  ●  ●      ●  
GNEP   ●    ●  ●  ◘  ●  ●        
Legend: ○ Member and donor ● Member ◘ Observer 
Notes: The EU is represented at G8 summits but is not counted as one of the eight members. 
The EU is a donor to the GGFR, and it led the launch of the JREC. The European 
Commission is a member of the CSLF, the IPHE and the REEEP. EURATOM is a member of 
the GIF. The non-G8+5 participants are not listed. 
Source: Modified from Table 3, Appendix 3, Fujiwara (2007). 
Table A3.4 Bilateral global partnerships and their main participants 
  CA FR DE IT JA RU UK US BR CH IN ME SA EU 
Fossil 
Fuel 
●    ●   ●  ●  ○  ●  ●a)   ●b)      
ENERGY 
STAR 
●      ●    ○          ● 
I-NERI  ●  ●     ●    ○  ●          
EU 
Cooper-
ation  
       ●  ●  ●c)  ●d)  ●e)     ○ 
a) The bilateral Fossil Energy Protocol has been extended to 2010. There is also a public–
private partnership, the US–China Oil and Gas Industry Forum.  
b) A US–India Energy Dialogue was launched in May 2005. 
c) A new Energy Policy Dialogue was launched in July 2007. 
d) The EU–China Partnership on Climate Change was agreed in September 2005. 
e)  The EU–India Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change was agreed in 
September 2005. 
Legend: ○ Host country ● Its partners  
Note: The non-G8+5 participants are not listed.  
Source: Modified from Table 4, Appendix 3, Fujiwara (2007).  
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APPENDIX 4. REPORT OF THE TRANSPORT 
SUB-GROUP, MAY 2007 
CEPS G8+5 Climate Change Task Force – An Integrated Approach 
The mobility dilemma 
Transport services facilitate the movement of goods and services, enabling 
economic growth and improving human welfare. These same transport 
services also create more demand for the mobility of products and hence, 
more trips and vehicles. 
The environmental and safety impacts of increased levels of mobility 
can include greenhouse gas (GHG) and conventional emissions, congestion, 
accidents and noise. These are to be addressed by industrial and political 
activities in order to ensure sustainability and enable continued economic 
growth.  
Figure A4.1 The mobility dilemma 
 
Background – Where does transport fit in? 
Transport makes a considerable contribution to GHG emissions. In the year 
2000, transport contributed worldwide about 14% of global GHG 
emissions, representing roughly 21% of energy emissions (mainly CO2 – see 
Stern, 2007). The transport proportion is somewhat higher in North 
America, which itself represents about 25% of global GHG emissions. Light 
vehicle transport (passenger cars and vans) represent less than half of 
transport emissions. MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 63 
 
Figure A4.2 GHG contributing sectors   Figure A4.2 Transport split 
 
Source: Stern (2007). 
According to the Stern report (2007), transport’s contribution is likely 
to remain at 14% of total GHG emissions by 2050, even as total emissions 
double between 2000 and 2050. Most of the growth in transport emissions 
will come from China, Asia, Latin America and North America. 
Principles for reducing global transportation GHG emissions 
Since global transportation is a contributor to GHG emissions (mainly CO2 
and NOx), it is reasonable for this sector to contribute to a reduction in 
GHG emissions. It is also important to note that transport GHG emissions 
are indistinguishable from GHG emissions from other sources or with 
respect to country of origin. Policies on reducing emissions from transport 
should recognise it as part of an economy-wide and global issue. The 
following principles should be applied when considering policy and 
technology options for this sector: 
•  Transport GHG contributions should be seen as one part of an entire 
system, in conjunction with all the other sectors. 
•  Ultimately, GHG emission reduction measures should be global in 
nature, with regional measures to be viewed as a stage on the way to 
global agreements. 
•  The target for policy measures is to limit or reduce total GHG 
emissions and thereby assist in limiting atmospheric GHG 
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•  Measures should be non-discriminatory. There should be no ‘picking 
technology winners’. 
•  Against the background of the enormous efforts that are necessary to 
mitigate climate change, measures and technology must achieve cost-
effectiveness. 
•  In developing regulations, comprehensive and independent impact 
assessments, including all relevant sectors, are essential. 
•  Many stakeholders contribute to the CO2 emissions of vehicles in 
transport; therefore, all these stakeholders should be involved in 
reducing CO2 emissions in order to realise the most cost-effective 
solutions. 
Adhering to the above principles, abatement costs should ideally be 
the same throughout the entire economy, preferably globally. In this study, 
we concentrate on transport-specific measures, taking into account the 
economy-wide and global nature of GHG emissions in developing policy 
options. 
For the transportation sector, the last principle mentioned above, 
referring to the contributions of many stakeholders, leads to the policy 
foundation of an integrated approach, as described below. 
Rationale, measures and stakeholders for an integrated approach 
An integrated approach involves all the stakeholders in securing solutions 
to meet policy objectives, in contrast to concentrating on only one aspect, 
e.g. technology. The contributions from technology should be 
complemented by those from other stakeholders, including users, 
government and associated industries. To work well, the principle of cost-
effectiveness should be applied to any integrated approach to achieve the 
greatest benefit at the least cost. 
The relevant stakeholders can be summarised into four groups: the 
automotive industry, the fuel industry, government and 
drivers/consumers. Similarly, measures c a n  b e  g r o u p e d  i n t o  f o u r  a r e a s :  
automotive technology, fuels, infrastructure and driver behaviour.  
Table A4.1 indicates the measures that are available to affect change 
by each of these four groups in each of the four areas. In addition, the 
influence of policy on each of the areas is shown in the final column. The 
lightly shaded fields represent those that are appropriate for inclusion in an 
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Table A4.1 Measures for an integrated approach 
 Responsible  stakeholders 
Areas of 
responsibility 
Automotive 
industry 
Fuel industry  Drivers/ consumers  Government 
agencies 
Policy levers 
Auto 
technology 
Automotive 
technology 
Marketing  
Fuel quality  Vehicle purchasing 
decision 
R&D support 
Commercialisation 
support 
CO2 labelling standards 
Tax/incentive policy 
R&D support 
Fuels  Technology to 
enable 
alternative fuels 
Low-CO2 fuels 
(especially 
biofuels) 
Fuel purchasing 
decision 
R&D support 
Commercialisation 
support 
Fuel quality standards 
Well-to-wheel standards for 
fuels 
Tax/incentive policies 
Infrastructure & 
transport policy 
 
ITS technologies 
Use of 
alternative 
transit 
-  ITS access and use 
Use of alternative 
transit 
ITS support 
Infrastructure 
construction and 
management 
Resources for infrastructure 
Standards for ITS 
Availability of alternative 
transit 
Driving 
behaviour 
GSI 
Eco-driving 
information 
Fuel availability 
information 
Eco-driving 
information 
Driving style 
Vehicle usage 
Maintenance 
Information on 
driving style & car 
usage 
Education on eco-
driving 
Tax/incentive policies 
 Selected measures/responsibilities in focus for an integrated approach on CO2;   Potential policy levers 
ITS: Intelligent transport systems 
GSI: Gear shift indicator 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Tasks for each stakeholder in an integrated approach 
Automotive industry 
Below is a list of the main categories of measures available for 
implementation by the automobile industry and more detailed examples of 
the elements at which measures can be targeted. The industry itself is in the 
best position to determine which technical measures are most cost-effective 
in meeting targets. Policies for regulating emissions should recognise the 
cost implications of the measures available. Thus, the selection of emissions 
limits in this and other markets, if applied, should be decided based on 
independent impact assessments, which should help to determine the cost-
effectiveness of all available measures within an integrated approach.  
•  Automotive technology options  
−  Increased engine efficiency 
−  Weight reduction  
−  Higher-efficiency components and appliances 
−  Improved aerodynamics & mechanical friction 
•  Behavioural technology options 
−  Gear shift indicator 
−  Develop and install intelligent transport system accessories 
•  Consumer information 
−  Promote eco-driving  
−  Support transparency in consumer/driver information on CO2 
emissions (e.g. labelling) 
Fuel supply and delivery industry 
Below is a list of the main categories of measures available for the 
implementation of fuels to reduce GHG emissions. As with automotive 
technology, it is appropriate for cost-effective solutions to be identified and 
for policy and regulation to reflect this. Again, this approach requires 
independent impact assessments to determine the optimum stringency of 
policy measures in comparison with measures in other areas. 
•  Increase the market penetration of alternative fuels with low CO2 
intensity, in particular biofuels. 
•  Improve the CO2 intensity of conventional fuels. MAKING THE MOST OF THE G8+5 CLIMATE CHANGE PROCESS | 67 
 
•  Provide the infrastructure for alternative fuels. 
•  Provide the infrastructure for tyre inflation. 
•  Provide low-viscosity oil. 
Drivers/consumers 
Drivers of cars and trucks are the direct link in the chain to actual CO2 
emissions. Their behaviour leads straight to the consumption of fuel and 
emissions of CO2. Their behaviour is difficult to mandate or regulate, and 
hence measures in this category mainly relate to the adaptation of 
behaviour through information and training. The following behavioural 
measures can be employed by individuals, and are highly cost-effective 
since behavioural changes do not involve a financial outlay. Similarly, 
consumers (i.e. the person who purchases the vehicle, who may be distinct 
from the driver) have an influence through their decisions on vehicle 
purchase. 
•  Employ eco-driving. 
•  Complete regular maintenance. 
•  Adapt behaviour by reducing unnecessary trips, by telecommuting, 
etc. 
•  Consider alternative modes of transport according to the available 
infrastructure. 
•  Consider CO2 emissions as a factor in the initial vehicle purchase. 
Government agencies 
Specific substantive measures can be employed by governments that have a 
direct effect on consumption and CO2 emissions: 
•  Improve road traffic management through the intelligent design of 
roads and support for intelligent transport systems. 
•  Improve and build the infrastructure to reduce congestion and 
facilitate traffic flow. 
•  Financially support R&D and commercialisation for vehicle and fuel 
technologies. 
•  Support eco-driving programmes by offering training and 
implementing a validation scheme. 
•  Manage the public procurement of vehicles and fuels with 
consideration for environmental criteria. 68 | APPENDIX 4 
 
Actions by policy-makers 
These actions refer to the measures that will in the medium and long term 
influence the decision-making of other stakeholders and thereby encourage 
the shift towards technologies and activities that reduce GHG emissions (as 
distinct from specific substantive measures implemented by government 
agencies). In this context, the most useful measures that can be 
implemented by policy-makers are the employment of stringent, 
independent and objective impact assessments to determine the cost-
effectiveness and affordability of all the available technical and non-
technical options. This step will facilitate the setting of regulatory standards 
at the appropriate level and will lend support to those actions that will help 
to reduce CO2 emissions but cannot be regulated directly. 
In addition, the following measures can be applied by governments: 
•  Shift taxation towards a proportional CO2 basis (and by implication 
away from existing tax bases), increasingly harmonised within and 
between regions. This approach ensures a clear and consistent signal 
among markets through a consistent or harmonised price of CO2 
emissions and therefore a uniform incentive to reduce emissions. 
•  Promote other incentives for the purchase of vehicles and fuels 
according to their CO2 reduction performance. In particular, under 
circumstances in which tax treatment is not an option, incentives can 
be designed to achieve similar results as shifts in taxation. 
•  The level of CO2 taxation (or other incentives) will determine how 
producers and consumers value CO2 and thus the amount of CO2 
reduction that can be achieved in the transportation sector. 
•  Implement programmes to increase the transparency of information 
on the CO2 performance of cars and fuels, driver behaviour and 
financial incentives, including the standardisation of labelling and 
other information sources. 
•  Support and implement the commonality of relevant technology 
standards, in particular for fuel quality, well-to-wheel GHG balance 
of fuels, vehicle regulations and intelligent transport systems. These 
standards assist in ensuring that the market signals through a global 
price on CO2 are efficiently transmitted throughout the economy. 
•  Make long-term resources available to support policy, in particular 
for infrastructure development and support for R&D and 
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Summary – Achieving an integrated approach effectively and efficiently 
Actions by policy-makers are fundamental to progress in implementing an 
integrated approach in the transportation sector, according to the general 
policy measures above. 
Independently and in response to policy signals, other stakeholders – 
including businesses and consumers – should implement measures that 
reduce overall CO2 emissions, consistent with economic effectiveness and 
good (corporate) citizenship, in addition to adhering to technical 
regulations.  
An ideal national, regional or even global policy would be one that 
puts a price on GHG emissions, so that consumers and businesses are 
encouraged through their financial interests to reduce emissions. Actions in 
this direction include GHG taxation and other fiscal measures, which, to 
work well, should yield the same value for CO2 economy-wide. Within 
such a framework, policies can be applied to reach the high-level GHG 
reduction targets determined by policy-makers. The lever to achieve the 
reductions is therefore the value given to CO2, and thus the reductions in 
emissions that are necessary to reach the targets are attained where they 
make the greatest economic sense. This is the ultimate integrated approach.  
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